Polish German Agreement
December 14th, 2020
December 14th, 2020
In August 1940, the Soviet Union temporarily suspended its deliveries as part of its trade agreement, after differences over policy in Romania, the Soviet war with Finland, Germany`s relapse in goods deliveries under the pact, and Stalin`s fear that Hitler`s war with the West would end quickly after France signed a ceasefire.  The suspension caused major resource problems for Germany.  At the end of August, relations were improving again, as countries redesigned the Hungarian and Romanian borders and settled some Bulgarian demands, and Stalin was again convinced that with the improvement of Britain`s air fight against Germany and the implementation of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain on destroyers and bases Germany would face a long war in the West.  Pilsudski chose to take advantage of the power and global isolation of the newly formed German regime as an excellent opportunity to minimize the risk that Poland would run if it were a victim of German aggression. German leaders seemed to oppose the Prussian anti-polio stance. Moreover, Pilsudski believed that the new chancellor seemed less threatening than his immediate predecessors, and that the Soviet Union appeared to be a major threat. The deal stunned the world. John Gunther recalled in August 1939 in Moscow that the news of the 19 August trade agreement surprised journalists and diplomats during the Soviet-French-British negotiations, but hoped for world peace. They did not expect the announcement of the non-aggression pact on 21 August: “Nothing more incredible was conceivable. Astonishment and skepticism quickly turned into dismay and alarm.”  The news was greeted with total dismay and surprise by government leaders and the world`s media, most of whom knew only the Franco-British negotiations that had been taking place for months;   by Germany`s allies, especially Japan; Communist International and foreign communist parties; and Jewish communities around the world.  On August 25, 1939, the New York Times published a cover of Otto D.
Tolischus, “Nazi Talks Secret,” whose subtitles were “Soviet And Reich Agreements on the East.”  On August 26, 1939, the New York Times reported on Japanese anger and the French communist surprise over the pact. But on the same day, Tolichus filed a story that was recorded by Nazi troops on the way to Gleiwitz (now Gliwice), which led to the Gleiwitz incident, on August 31, 1939, under the false flag.  On August 28, 1939, the New York Times reported the fear of a robbery on Gleiwitz.  On August 29, 1939, the New York Times reported that the Supreme Soviet had failed on the first day of its convening for the Covenant Act.  On the same day, the New York Times also reported from Montreal, Canada, that American professor Samuel N. Harper of the University of Chicago had publicly expressed his belief that “the Russian-German non-aggression pact concealed an agreement that Russia and Germany could have served spheres of influence for Eastern Europe.”  On August 30, 1939, the New York Times reported a Soviet construction on its western borders, moving 200,000 soldiers from the Far East.  On January 10, 1941, Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement that resolved several ongoing issues.  Secret protocols of the new agreement amended the “secret additional protocols” of the German-Soviet Treaty on Borders and Friendship and sent the Lithuanian Band back to the Soviet Union in exchange for $7.5 million (31.5 million Marks).  The agreement officially established the border between Germany and the Soviet Union between the Igorka River and the Baltic Sea.  In addition, it extended the trade regime of the German-Soviet trade agreement from 1940 until 1 August 1942, increased deliveries beyond the level of the first year of the agreement, the trade rights populated in the Baltics and Bessarabia, calculated the compensation of German real estate interests in the Baltic states, now occupied by the Soviets, and covered by